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DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY:
CONTRACT CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Limited liability is frequently a primary consideration for adopting
the corporate form of business organization. A shareholder or parent
corporation invests in the enterprise with the expectation that it will not
be liable for the obligations of the corporation. Those doing business
with a corporation are ordinarily forewarned that they may look only
to the corporation income and assets for security. Occasionally, how-
ever, the courts have "drawn aside the veil"' in order to impose liability
on a shareholder, parent, or affiliated corporation. The purpose of this
comment is to analyse the reasons advanced by the courts for disregard-
ing the normal expectations of the parties and to suggest criteria for
predicting when the separate identity of the obligor corporation will be
ignored.
The apparently responsible corporation's separate existence has
been disregarded in many diverse situations,' but the reasons usually
advanced by the courts have been relatively few, confusingly general,
and often misleading. The relation between parent and subsidiary cor-
porations, once described as enveloped in the mists of metaphor,' has
not been clarified. The factual patterns which lead to shareholder or
affiliate liability have not been clearly stated, and the reasons given by
courts for imposing liability or withholding the remedy are frequently
no more than an election of epithet.4 In addition, some courts have failed
to recognize that the reasons for disregarding the corporate entity in
1 Fairfield County Turnpike Co. v. Thorpe, 13 Conn. 173, 179 (1839) (Williams,
C. J.) (dictum).
2 See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 170 F.2d 783 (7th Cir.) (injunc-
tion), af 'g 78 F. Supp. 250 (NJ). ]11. 1948); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334
(2d Cir. 1945) (taxation); Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp. v. Fourth Natl Bank,
280 F. 879 (M.D. Ala.) (breach of warranty), aff'd, 284 F. 718 (5th Cir. 1922); United
States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (ED. Wis. 1905) (illegal re-
bates) ; Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (personal injury claim); Indus-
trial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623 (N.D. Ohio 1928) (service of
process); Telis v. Tells, 132 N.J. Eq. 25, 26 A.2d 249 (1942) (dower in corporate realty).
3 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
4 Compare Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832
(1955), with Automotriz del Golfo de California SA. de C. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792,
306 P.2d 1 (1957). Compare Wagner v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 237 App. Div. 175, 261
N.Y.S. 136 (1932), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 699, 185 N.E. 799, with Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp.,
127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942).
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contract cases rest on entirely different policies than those obtaining in
cases involving torts, taxation, or fiduciary or domestic relations. Analy-
sis of the cases reveals, however, that the doctrine of disregarding the
corporate entity embraces a number of separate policies which under
particular circumstances outweigh the policy behind limited liability.
The conflict between limited liability and competing policies is
sharpest in the contract cases because they involve consensual trans-
actions. Before making a contract, a creditor is normally expected to
ascertain that he is doing business with a corporation and that it will
be able to satisfy his claim. This burden is imposed on the creditor be-
cause limited liability is a permissible object of incorporation,5 and is
regarded as a desirable and indeed necessary form of business organiza-
tion in a private economy where risk capital is to be encouraged. 6 But
the principle of limited liability does not protect the shareholder or
affiliate whose conduct is calculated to defeat the reasonable expecta-
tions of the creditor.
Disregarding the corporate entity is an equitable doctrine which
permits courts to penetrate form to find the substance of a transaction
in order to prevent actual or constructive fraud or injustice.7 While
equitable in nature, it is not limited to equity jurisdiction,' nor does it
appear that the existence of an alternative legal remedy bars its applica-
tion at law or in equity. The kinds of fraud or wrong that appear to
support relief under the doctrine appear to be independently actionable
under other theories of liability, but the existence of alternative reme-
dies against the defendant is rarely discussed.
An action in deceit would seem to be an alternative basis for re-
covery from a shareholder or affiliate in those cases where it is granted
by the disregard device, but the deceit remedy might be barred in most
cases by a short statute of limitations and by difficulties of proving a
material misrepresentation, detrimental reliance, and intent. Another
alternative remedy might be an action in the nature of breach of con-
tract or warranty obligations expressed or implied in the circumstances
of the credit transaction, but the statute of frauds would usually ob-
struct the creditor's proof of the promise by the defendant when the
contract was with the corporation. Whatever the reasons, the theoretical
availability of a deceit, contract, or warranty remedy does not seem to
5 See Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955).
6 See Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 262 N.W. 371 (1935).
7 Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.f. Ark. 1951);
Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957).
8 Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). See generally




affect a consensual creditor's claim against a shareholder or affiliate
when his apparent, corporate obligor is financially unable to respond.
The claims to be discussed arise in the context of the creditor
plaintiff's contractual relationship with a corporation unable to meet
its obligations, and his attempt to go behind his apparent obligor's
separate legal personality to hold a shareholder or affiliate on one of
several theories of action. Of the theories asserted in the contract cases,
only that proceeding from defendant's legal fraud or wrong requires the
court to disregard the corporate entity and impose liability on a de-
fendant in its capacity as a shareholder or affiliate. While theories of
agency, identity, and enterprise entity are often interjected in suits
against shareholders or affiliates, these do not impose liability by
ignoring the normal corporate barrier, but rather require the defendant
to respond to legal obligations as a principal. The failure of the courts
to distinguish between defendant's capacity as a principal and its
capacity as a shareholder or affiliate is one source of the confusion that
surrounds the device of disregarding the corporate entity. Since the
characteristic of limited liability is the only essential difference between
a shareholder or affiliate in a control relation to a corporation and a
principal whose business is conducted by the corporate enterprise, it is
necessary to consider the principle of limited liability whenever liability
for a corporate obligation is imposed on a shareholder or affiliate. When
there is sufficient reason for refusal to apply the principle of limited
liability, it might be said that a shareholder is thereby indistinguishable
from a principal and is responsible for the corporate obligation on
ordinary agency grounds. In the contract cases, however, such reason-
ing is a perversion of doctrines used to impose liability on principals.
Principals are legally responsible irrespective of fraud or wrong, but the
cases establish that the courts require a showing of defendant's fraudu-
lent or wrongful conduct before liability is imposed on a shareholder or
affiliate which is not a principal.
The reasons for disregarding the corporate entity in cases not
involving consensual transactions, principally tort cases, are different
than in contract cases because the non-consenual creditor plaintiff has
no real opportunity to choose not to do business with a corporation.
While the policy behind limited liability might be as strong in tort cases
as in contract cases,9 the allocation of risks in non-consensual trans-
actions rests on a different footing. There is very clearly a public
policy limitation on the amount of risk that a shareholder or affiliate in
a control relation with a corporation may effectively transfer to the
9 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) ; Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht,
238 N.Y. 254, 144 N.E. 519 (1924).
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public by the maintenance and operation of a judgment-proof corpora-
tion, the business of which creates any substantial risk of harm to mem-
bers of the public.10 Since there is rarely any antecedent transaction by
which the tort claimant's reasonable expectation may be measured, a
remedy in disregard of a corporate entity barrier may be given only
when the attempted transfer of economic risk is treated as a legal wrong
in itself, and since there are few standards by which the propriety of
the attempted transfer of risk may be measured, such a remedy is per-
haps more frequently granted by treating the conduct creating the claim
as that of the shareholder or affiliate."
In still other kinds of cases, where the corporate entity barrier is
not challanged by a contract or tort creditor, the reasons for ignoring
apparent corporate limitations are different from those where a con-
sensual or non-consensual credit transaction is involved. The policy
behind limited liability may have no application. For example, in taxa-
tion cases, the issue is the impact of federal or state taxation policy on
given business activity and the question is ultimately how much tax is
due rather than the limitation of liability for its payment. 2 In a case
where the question is the application to a corporation of an injunction
previously issued against an affiliate, the issue is the extent of activity
covered and financial liability is not involved.3 Similarly, when the
questions are whether trustees controlling a corporation with stock be-
longing to the trust must account for the affairs of the corporation or only
for the shares of stock 4 and whether service of process on a subsidiary
is effective to join a parent corporation in a lawsuit,'5 the respective
policies involved are those of fiduciary standards and due process, and
the principle of limited liability is not chalianged. The question of dower
10 Garden City Co. v. Burden, 186 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1951); Mull v. Colt Co., 31
F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Ross v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 N.J.L. 536, 148 A. 741
(1930).
11 The latter approach is the more realistic. To say that the corporate entity is ever
disregarded is misleading because it is never disregarded for all purposes. What is perhaps
better to say is that limited liability is inapplicable for a particular purpose and may not
be successfully asserted by a particular party defendant. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union
Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 288, 107 S.W.2d 41 (1937). Accord, Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N.Y.S. 883 (Sup. Ct. 1927). See Powell § 13(f),
20.
12 E.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Paymer v.
Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
'3 E.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 170 F.2d 783 (7th Cir.), aff'g 78 F.
Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
14 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N.Y.S. 883 (Sup. Ct.
1927).
's Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623 (NZD. Ohio 1928).
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rights in realty owned by a one-man corporation does not involve
limited liability since the usual course of the corporate entity cases is
reversed and it is sought to hold the corporation by way of an equitable
attachment for the share holder's legal obligations. Only a question of
statutory interpretation of the dower right is presented. 6
Bankruptcy cases present two distinct problems. When a creditor
seeks to hold a shareholder or affiliate for the whole of, or any deficiency
in satisfying the corporate obligation, a question of the effect of limited
liability is directly presented. In fact, most of the contract claims
against a shareholder or affiliate arise only after discovery that the
obligor corporation is insolvent and are frequently asserted during
bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, the solvency of the obligor corpora-
tion may be a ground for denying relief against a shareholder or affili-
ate." A different question is presented, however, in bankruptcy cases
when the creditor seeks not to hold the shareholder or affiliate on the
corporate obligation, but to preclude its participation in the bankrupt's
estate in the same or a prior class as a creditor competing with the com-
plainant. The issue in this latter kind of case is not one of liability,
but concerns the classification and validity of interests protected by a
statutory scheme for corporate reorganization and bankruptcy admin-
istration,18 and will not be discussed in this comment. While the conduct
that might bar a shareholder or affiliate from asserting a competing
claim against a bankrupt appears to be of the same kind that might
warrant imposition of liability on it in disregard of the corporate en-
tity, the equitable bar of a shareholder or affiliate claim in its capacity
as a creditor is but one remedy on the path of creditor's remedies and
does not require a fresh contribution to satisfy the creditor in full. It is
therefore essential to analyse separately the two kinds of bankruptcy
cases according to the relief sought and granted since the principle of
limited liability is involved only when an affirmative contribution is
sought from the shareholder or affiliate.
The propensity of courts to treat all of these cases as involving an
issue of disregarding the corporate entity, and their failure to distinguish
the capacity in which liability is imposed on the defendant is perhaps
due to the conceptualization of the corporation as a legal person; the
inference therefrom is that whenever someone else is to be responsible
for the activity of the corporate person the entity of the corporate per-
son must be disregarded. While this literal mindedness should long ago
16 E.g., Tells v. Tells, 132 N.J. Eq. 25, 26 A.2d 249 (1942). But see Frank v. Frank's,
Inc., 9 N.J. 218, 87 A.2d 724 (1952).
17 See Powell § 17.
18 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). Accord, Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Elec. Co., 306 U.S.: 307 (1939).
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have subsided, there are relatively few cases with precisely similar
issues reflecting the same conflict of policies, and many precedents are
old. It should now be clear that the corporation is no more than a form
of business organization. The occasional analogy to persons is deceptive,
and it might be more accurate to perceive incorporation as a contrac-
tual term limiting liability, imputed by law to the agreements of all who
would deal with the incorporated enterprise and subject to application,
construction, waiver, and estoppel on ordinary contract principles. This
notion has some utility in explaining the results in contract cases, but
its application in cases where the plaintiff and the corporation were not
in a consensual relationship, from which acceptance might be inferred,
is open to doubt. There is little reason, however, for discarding the doc-
trine of defendant's fraud or wrong in disregarding the corporate en-
tity, which when properly applied can adequately explain the imposition
of liability on a shareholder or affiliate which is not a principal. It is
noteworthy that while the opinions in cases purportedly involving an
issue of disregarding the corporate entity usually do not state the
grounds on which liability is imposed sufficiently to enable prediction,
the decisions nevertheless adequately protect the principle of limited
liability by not imposing liability in the absence of a legal fraud or
wrong.
The contract cases are a source of confusion in the law of disre-
garding the corporate entity because they present the sharpest conflict
between the policy behind limited liability and those policies affording
relief against a shareholder or affiliate, and because the courts fail to
make statements of the real grounds for liability. For this reason, the
following discussion deals primarily with consensual creditor's claims
against a shareholder, either individual or corporate as in the parent
and subsidiary corporation situation, or affiliate, where the obligor
corporation and the defendant are controlled by a common shareholder.
While the particular conduct of the defendant that supports liability
may be peculiar to one of these kinds of defendants, the principles on
which liability is imposed are the same. For example, it is unlikely
that an affiliate could lead a creditor to believe that he was not dealing
with a corporation, but the same principle would suggest liability when
it concealed the affiliated nature of the obligor in order to create the
expectation that it would be responsible for the debt. It is therefore
unnecessary for the purposes of discussion to distinguish between the
kinds of defendants.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDER OR AFFILIATE LIABILITY
Contract creditors have attempted to hold shareholders and affili-
ates on four distinct theories: disregarding the corporate entity, agency,
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identity, and enterprise entity. While one or more of these theories are
often advocated in the alternative, it is only the theory of disregarding
the corporate entity that requires imposition of liability on a defendant
in its capacity as a shareholder or affiliate because the other three the-
ories impose liability on principals who are not protected by the prin-
ciple of limited liability. According to courts and scholars the liability
of a defendant in its capacity as a shareholder or affiliate is governed
by three elements: the instrumentality rule, defendant's fraud or wrong,
and plaintiff's injury. The second element is often defined to include
the third. While the latter two elements are clearly related to defend-
ant's liability as a shareholder or affiliate, the so-called instrumentality
rule is open to criticism because it does not help to explain the cases
but rather tends to interject false issues which becloud understanding
of the process of disregarding the corporate entity and hamper pre-
diction of liability of shareholders or affiliates which are not principals.
A. The Instrumentality Rule
The so-called instrumentality rule is cited as the first condition to
relief against a shareholder or affiliate. Professor Powell formulated
the rule from statements in cases where the separate corporate entity
was held to be no barrier to the relief sought.' In his influential work
on parent and subsidiary corporations, he consisely stated the rule as
follows: "So far as the question of control alone is concerned, the par-
ent corporation will be responsible for the obligations of its subsidiary
when its control has been exercised to such a degree that the subsidi-
ary has become its mere instrumentality." 20 This formulation or in-
distinguishable variations on it have been widely repeated by Ameri-
can courts.2 The difficulty with the instrumentality rule is that it does
not provide meaningful criteria for deciding when to disregard the
corporate entity. It is used as a substitute for reasoned analysis of the
19 In a leading case, the United States Supreme Court said: "where such ownership
of stock is resorted to, not for the purpose of participating in the affairs of the corpo-
ration in which it is held in a manner that is normal and usual to stockholders, but for
the purpose of making it a mere agent, or instrumentality or department of another com-
pany, the courts will look through the forms to the realities of the relation between the
companies as if the corporate agency did not exist and will deal with them as the justice
of the case may require." United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 62 (1920) (emphasis
added). Accord, United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 220 U.S. 257 (1911). It should be
noted that neither of these cases involves the principle of limited liability, but statutory
prohibitions sought to be avoided by the subsidiary device.
20 Powell § S.
21 Id. See W. M. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations §§ 41, 42 (perm. ed. rev.
1963) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher]; R. S. Stevens, Private Corporations § 18 (2d ed.
1949).
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real factors behind decisions.2" In one sense, all corporations are the
instrumentalities of their shareholders since there would be little rea-
son to incorporate were it not to advance the interests of the share-
holders.2 3 Indeed, corporate instrumentalities are recognized to be
permissible shields against liability in the many situations where the
principle of limited liability prevails.24
What facts constitute a corporation an instrumentality for pur-
poses of the rule is an unanswerable question. A catalogue of the
most common situations includes those recited in cases where relief is
granted. But these same facts are largely mirrored in those cases where
relief is denied. No combination or permutation of the commonly re-
ported facts upon which conclusions that certain corporations were or
were not instrumentalities has ever been established as controlling.25
Powell has catalogued the following factors: ownership of all or most
of the corporation stock; common directors or officers; the parent
finances the subsidiary; the corporation is inadequately capitalized;
the defendant pays corporation expenses; the corporation has no assets
or business other than that acquired through the defendant; the de-
fendant treats the corporation as a department; the defendant used
corporation property as its own; the directors and officers take orders
from the defendant; the corporate formalities, such as directors meet-
ings and separate records, are not regularly observed.26 The presence
of all or a number of these factors clearly shows a degree of dominance
by the shareholder or affiliate, but the question remains whether such
dominance is a legitimate basis for disregarding the corporate entity.
An analysis of the cases reveals that some degree of dominance is
found in all the cases where plaintiffs seek successfully2" or unsuccess-
fully 2 8 to hold liable a shareholder or affiliate. While it is impossible to
make a comparison of defendants' dominance in the cases, it may be
noted that a control relationship through stock ownership or a common
shareholder, which is essential to proof of defendant's causation of
plaintiff's loss, exists in virtually all of the cases discussing the issue.20
22 See E. Latty, Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations 157-58 (1936) [hereinafter
cited as Latty].
23 May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 288, 107 S.W.2d
41 (1937).
24 Accord, Carlesmo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948); Gledhill
v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 262 N.W. 371 (1935); Bartle v. Home Owners Co-opera-
tive, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955); North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507,
3 N.E.2d 391, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1936).
25 See Powell § 6; Fletcher § 43.
26 Powell § 6.
27 See cases cited notes 2, 7 and 10 supra.
28 See cases cited notes 9 and 24 supra.
29 Powell § 6(a).
[Vol. 28
COMMENTS
Some common directors and officers are found in the parent and sub-
sidiary cases, but uniformity of leadership is rarely complete. 30 Financ-
ing by the defendant is often recited but rarely relied upon as a basis
for liability. 1 Incorporation for the very purpose of avoiding liability
is approved by some courts and declared to be against public policy by
others.32 Similarly, cries of inadequate capitalization have met with
varied response in the courts,
33
The remaining factors catalogued by Powell and often recited in
opinions include defendant's use of corporation property, supervising
officers and directors and responsibility for failure to have director's
meetings or keep separate records. These are instances of intermeddling
in the corporation's affairs. Without showing where these harm the
plaintiff, it is difficult to understand why such intermeddling should
result in liability. Responsibility should not be found because the ap-
plication of the instrumentality rule requires, additionally, a legal fraud
or wrong. It seems, however, that such intermeddling may have become
confused with the requirement of a wrong and received treatment as
the wrong itself in some cases.34 One of these remaining factors, officers
or directors taking orders from the defendant owner, is particularly
open to question. When such orders are in a short circuit of the corpo-
ration's formal governmental structure, they are simply intermeddling,
but when they are limited to communication of the owner's goals it is
doubtful that such order giving constitutes intermeddling for purposes
of the rule. If all orders of the shareholder to corporate officers or direc-
30 See, e.g., May Dep't. Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 288,
107 S.W.2d 41 (1937); Ross v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 N.J.L. 536, 148 A. 741 (1930).
But see, e.g., Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir, 1942).
31 See Powell § 6(c).
32 Compare Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 144 N.E. 519 (1924), with Mull v.
Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The issue of liability avoidance is highlighted
in the so-called one-man corporation cases, and incorporation therein is generally upheld.
W. D. Miller Lumber Corp. v. Miller, 225 Ore. 427, 357 P.2d 503 (1960). But cf. Sham-
rock Oil and Gas Co. v. Ethridge, 159 F. Supp. 693 (D. Colo. 1958).
33 Compare Carlesmo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948), with
Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958). At least one court has said that even if
the defendant is liable for inadequate capitalization, it is only to the extent of the inade-
quacy, and not necessarily to the extent of the claim. Arnold v. Phillips (In re Southern
Brewing Co.), 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1947). See also Luck-
enback S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir.) (semble), cert. denied, 254
U.S. 644 (1920).
34 See Garden City Co. v. Burden, 186 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1951) ; Weisser v. Mursam
Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942); Stark Elec. R.R. v. McGinty Contracting Co.,
238 F. 657 (6th Cir. 1917); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376
(W.D. Ark. 1951); Automotriz del Golfo de California S.A. de C. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d
792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957); Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428
(1957); Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940).
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tors were treated as intermeddling, impliedly illegitimate, defendants
might be penalized for exercising their legal rights to control the corpo-
ration.35 The inescapable conclusion is that the factors of an instru-
mentality are more or less present in all cases where relief against a
shareholder or affiliate is sought, but their degree is immeasurable and
their effect on the outcome indeterminable. 6 Perhaps the only accurate
observation that can be made of the factors catalogued by Powell and
cited by courts is that the strength and number of these factors in a
case may be symptomatic of a legal wrong. The courts may then grant
relief for that wrong without clearly pointing it out.
37
For the purposes of the instrumentality rule it is immaterial
whether the party defendant sought to be charged with the corporate
obligation is an individual or corporate shareholder, or an affiliated
corporation whose control of the obligor is effected through a common
controlling shareholder.38 While courts have experienced no difficulty
in penetrating the affiliated organization, some reservation is shown
when the usual configuration of the suit is reversed and the plaintiff
seeks to hold a subsidiary for the obligation of the parent corporation.
This may illustrate that it is the power of control rather than a mere
control relationship that warrants relief against a shareholder in a
proper case.39
In addition to the term "instrumentality," many other "emotive
epithets synonymous with and as empty"4 are used. The obligor cor-
poration is frequently described as an adjunct, agent,41 alter ego,
branch, department, form, puppet, sham, subterfuge, or tool, or found
to be an identity of the shareholder or affiliate.42 This plethora of terms
makes discussion and analysis difficult because none of them provide
meaningful criteria' for decision. No logical distinction can be made
between those fact situations supporting a conclusion that the obligor
is an instrumentality and those supporting a different epithet. One
35 See generally A. Berle & G. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property
bk. II (1933).
36 Compare cases cited notes, 2, 7 and 10 supra with cases cited notes 9 and 24 supra.
37 See cases cited note 34 supra.
38 See Luckenback S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
254 U.S. 644 (1920); Powell § 10. Cf. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 170 F.2d
783 (7th Cir. 1948); Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 280
F. 879 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 284 F. 718 (5th Cir. 1922).
39 See Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.
1929) (L. Hand, J.).
40 Latty 157-58.
41 Agency is usually used in a non-legal sense in this manner. See New York Trust
Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668 (6th Cir. 1918) (third Carpenter case).
42 See generally Latty.
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distinction, however, should be made. In two classes of what may be
described as "identity" cases, liability is seemingly imposed indepen-
dently of the instrumentality rule.
In the first class, the shareholder or affiliate is treated as the party
primarily liable because there is at least some doubt whether the con-
duct or obligation is that of the corporation or that of the shareholder
or affiliate. In a second class of "identity" case, the formal structure
of the corporate entity is found in such disrepair that it can legally
exist only in the teeth of state corporation laws. Its existence is diffi-
cult to observe in fact or in law.44 The question seemingly answered
in these cases of extreme disregard of formality is whether a corpora-
tion exists rather than whether a remedy ignoring it should be given.45
With the exception of cases defining the instrumentality rule or
one of its doctrinal synonyms very broadly, a finding that the apparent
obligor corporation was in fact the instrumentality of the shareholder
or affiliate will not alone result in disregarding the corporate obligor's
separate entity. 6 An additional finding of a legal fraud or wrong on the
part of the defendant is required.47
B. The Fraud or Wrong of the Defendant
A showing that the defendant shareholder or affiliate is guilty of
fraud or wrong is cited as the second condition to relief in disregard of
a corporate entity barrier." Such fraud or wrong is broadly defined,
and while it is usually an independently actionable wrong,49 or an inde-
pendent ground for relief,5" it occasionally appears to be something
less than actionable conduct on the part of the shareholder or affiliate.
43 See Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 280 F.879 (M.D.
Ala.), aff'd, 284 F. 718 (5th Cir. 1922); Garden City Co. v. Burden, 186 F.2d 651 (10th
Cir. 1951); Stark Elec. R.R. v. McGinty Contracting Co., 238 F. 657 (6th Cir. 1917).
Cf. Luckenback S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir.) (semble), cert denied,
254 U.S. 644 (1920); Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623
(N.D. Ohio 1928). See Powell §24.
44 E.g., Automotriz del Golfo de California S.A. de C. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792,
306 P.2d 1 (1957). Cf. Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428
(1957).
45 E.g., cases cited note 44 supra.
46 Cases cited notes 9 and 24 supra; Frank v. Frank's, Inc., 9 N.J. 218, 87 A.2d 724
(1952). See generally Fletcher §§ 41-48; Powell § 12.
47 Powell § 12. Query whether the two requirements are not often confused and
the operation of an instrumentality becomes itself a wrong. See cases cited note 24 supra.
48 Powell ch. III.
49 Codomo v. Emmanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1956); Quaid v. Ratkowsky, 183 App.
Div. 428, 170 N.Y.S. 812, aff'd, 224 N.Y. 624, 121 N.E. 887 (1918).
50 Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Ark. 1951);
Larson v. Western Underwriters, Inc., 77 S.D. 157, 87 N.W.2d 883 (1958).
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The oft-quoted statement of policy is that, "when the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an asso-
ciation of persons.""
While perhaps an overstatement," the declaration has been fre-
quently repeated and shareholders or affiliates have regularly been held
responsible for corporate obligations when a proper showing of fraud,
wrong, or illegality in the use of the corporate device has been made. 3
The contract cases, involving private, consensual relationships, rarely
involve illegality,54 and the battle lines are usually drawn on issues of
fraud or wrong.
On occasion, this second element of liability is defined to include
the third: injury, injustice, or inequity to the plaintiff if a remedy is
denied. In these cases the shareholder or affiliate is said not to have
wronged or defrauded the plaintiff unless there would be extraordinary
injury in the absence of relief. 5 Restating the elements of liability in
this manner has no apparent effect on the substance of the remedy."6
The fraud or wrong of the defendant shareholder or affiliate is
invariably alluded to but rarely specified in opinions in cases granting
relief. In many cases it seems to be stated as a conclusion and the facts
which would support such a conclusion are not clearly pointed out by
the courts. Taking at full value the many statements to the effect that
operation of a corporation as an instrumentality, without more, will
not support relief,57 an inventory of the kinds of fraud or wrong sup-
porting relief against a shareholder or affiliate can be made.
In one class of cases, relief is based on conduct of the defendant
which takes place before the plaintiff contracted with or extended credit
51 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (E.D. Wis. 1905)
(Sanborn, J.) (dictum in part).
52 No case has been found holding a shareholder not in a control relation nor privy
to a control group liable on a corporate obligation. But cf. Codomo v. Emmanuel, 91
So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956) (wife liable as silent partner in corporate fraud of husband).
53 See cases cited notes 7, 10, 49 and 50 supra; Powell § 12. See generally M. Worm-
ser, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporate Problems 1-85 (1927).
54 The notable exception is May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co.,
341 Mo. 288, 107 S.W.2d 41 (1937) (illegal contract utility rate), one of the better rea-
soned cases.
55 Powell § 14.
56 Powell favored three elements to facilitate understanding of factors which might
bar relief. Powell § 14. But California has adopted a two element rule with no apparent
difference in result. See Automotriz del California SA. de C. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792,
306 P.2d 1 (1957); Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957);
Carlesmo v. Schweble, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948); Marr v. Postal Union
Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940).
57 See cases cited notes 9 and 24 supra; Fletcher §§ 41-48; Powell § 12.
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to the corporation. The conduct is usually in the form of a misrepre-
sentation of one of three types. First, the defendant may have con-
cealed the fact of incorporation. For example, in Shafford v. Otto Sales
Company"3 plaintiff was a salesman who sued to recover commissions on
the sale of cocoanut made in behalf of defendant Otto who was doing
business as Otto Sales Company during the period of plaintiff's negotia-
tions with Otto. Subsequently, Otto almost secretly incorporated his
business with nominal capital and plaintiff discovered that his contract
had been concluded during the life of and assertedly with Otto Sales
Company, Inc. Furthermore, Otto having delayed plaintiff's knowledge
that the sales had been concluded, the corporation had run through
Otto's relatively large capital contribution and was quite unable to pay
the commissions. While the court discusses at length the inadequacy of
the corporation's capital, it notes that "plaintiff did not know that Otto
Sales Company was a corporation, nor did he understand that he was
dealing with a corporation." 9 Plaintiff had previously been denied relief
against Otto for failure to show that he believed he was dealing with
Otto personally and that the corporation was undercapitalized." If in-
adequate capitalization was a ground for relief, it was clearly not inde-
pendent but conjunctive with Otto's suppression of the fact of in-
corporation.61
Second, there may have been a representation that the defendant
stood behind the corporation, a sort of equitable contract of guarantee.
In Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corporation62 plaintiffs agreed to lease a
building to Murray and Samuel Rosenberg who told them the tenant
was to be Mursam Shoe Corporation and explained: "the name Mursam
was an abbreviation for Murray and Samuel, and that he and his brother
were the corporation and 'stood behind' the lease."" The corporation
was in fact a so-called "leasehold" corporation, without assets or busi-
ness except through defendants, maintained solely for the purpose of in-
sulating defendants and their occupying corporations under subleases
from liability on the lease. After performing for fourteen years of the
fifteen year lease, Mursam defaulted and plaintiffs sued the Rosenberg
brothers individually. Their allegations and affidavit were held to create
triable issues.64 Since respectable authority has upheld the use of lease-
r8 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957).
59 Id. at 431, 308 P.2d at 430.
60 Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d 849, 260 P.2d 269 (1953).
61 Id. Cf. Richmond & I. Const. Co. v. Richmond, N., I. & B. R.R., 68 F. 105 (6th
Cir. 1895).
62 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 345.
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hold corporations when dealing openly,6" the real ground for the deci-
sion was apparently the representation guaranteeing the obligation or
the operating nature of the corporation."
Third, there may have been a misrepresentation of the corpora-
tion's financial condition or the adequacy of its capital. This reason
for imposing liability is perhaps the least visible of all, possibly because
it rarely exists alone, and probably because it would be difficult to show
in cases where creditors have a right to rely on an appearance of wealth.
This may be the case with small creditors where business usage and the
size of the account would not warrant investigation of the corporate
debtor's credit. Furthermore, shareholders able to respond in damages
are not likely to conciously attempt this sort of deception with creditors
whose claims would be sizable and who could be expected to investi-
gate the obligor corporation's worth. Thus in most circumstances where
this sort of misrepresentation might occur, the claim could be expected
to be too small to litigate or the shareholder's worth would not warrant
litigation. There are cases, however, where the only reason that can
logically be advanced for the imposition of liability is a misrepresenta-
tion of worth. In Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corporation v. Fourth
National Bank,67 for example, the defendant bank acquired the assets of
the corporation on foreclosure, incorporated it through dummies, and fi-
nanced it tfirough loans, seeking to recoup losses on old loans on the
security of the assets. The bank was held liable for breach of warranty
on cotton oil sold by the corporation. While the case is beclouded by the
bank's defense of ultra vires, the only sound reason that the bank could
have been held liable was that, in resurrecting a diseased business and
giving it life through loans, it had sent it into the marketplace with an
appearance of financial soundness to sell faulty goods, an implied mis-
representation of wealth. 68
65 Wagner v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 237 App. Div. 175, 261 N.Y.S. 136, aff'd,
261 N.Y. 699, 185 N.E. 799 (1932); North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N.E.2d
391, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1936). In the principal case Judge Frank chafes at the
Wagner decision, avoiding it under conflict of laws rules since the real estate was not
located in New York, while yearning for "the old untrammeled days before Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins .. ." when liability could have been imposed on the authority of one of the
more liberal federal cases. 127 F.2d 347-48 & nn.7-10.
66 Accord, Quaid v. Ratkowsky, 183 App. Div. 428, 170 N.Y.S. 812, aff'd, 224 N.Y.
624, 121 N.E. 887 (1918).
67 280 F. 879 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 284 F. 718 (5th Cir. 1922).
68 Breach of warranty cases are arguably more like tort cases than other contract
cases, but the impermissible allocation of tort risk reason for disregarding the corporate
entity is not clearly applicable when, as in the principal case, the plaintiff is a buyer who
knew he was dealing with a corporation. Cf. Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal.
App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940).
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Not to be confused with representations of adequacy of capitaliza-
tion or worth is inadequate capitalization per se. The context in which
claims against a shareholder or affiliate arise is usually the insolvency
of the obligor corporation. Such insolvency is not infrequently caused
as a matter of economics solely or in part by inadequate original cap-
italization. Whatever its effect, inadequate original capitalization may
exist without a representation of adequacy or worth, and does not ap-
pear to be a satisfactory ground for relief.69
The foregoing examples illustrate the kinds of wrongs occurring
before the contract is made or credit extended for which relief is granted
against a shareholder or affiliate. In a second class of cases, the wrong-
ful conduct is subsequent to the formation of the contract. In Larson v.
Western Underwriters, Incorporated,7 plaintiffs entered into a land
contract for the purchase of a home from the defendant corporation
which had total assets consisting of three houses encumbered by mort-
gages. The corporation, used to conduct the business of Jacobson who
was principal shareholder, a director, and an officer, misapplied plain-
tiffs' contract payments, which exceeded the mortgage payments, and
was in imminent danger of insolvency. To protect the plaintiffs' equity
in the home, the court held Jacobson accountable. There was no show-
ing of fraud or wrong prior to the purchase, but the court held the
shareholder liable because he failed to apply plaintiffs' payments to the
preservation of the property, which plaintiffs could reasonably have
expected from their knowledge of the corporation's business.71
In Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Company72 the parent
corporation operated a subsidiary as a source of wood flooring at prices
substantially below an inflated market. The subsidiary was maintained
bankrupt but solvent in the equity sense by capital contributions of
the parent. Upon acquiring control stock independent of a former con-
trol group, and while liquidation could have satisfied creditors, the
parent increased its discount and ceased contributions which resulted
in almost immediate insolvency, leaving the parent the only secured
creditor. Going farther than would be required by the so-called "deep
rock" doctrine,"3 the parent corporation was held fully accountable to
creditors. 4
69 Carlesmo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948). Accord, Hanson
v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259 (1937).
70 77 S.D. 157, 87 N.W.2d 883 (1958).
71 The opinion in this case cannot be described as clear.
72 99 F. Supp. 376 (WD. Ark. 1951).
73 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) (creditor loses priority
against debtor in reorganization for manipulation).
74 99 F. Supp. at 384.
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The Larson and Henderson cases show that a shareholder or affili-
ate may be liable for certain conduct in managing the corporate obligor
subsequent to contracting or the extension of credit by the plaintiff.7 5
The limitation on this liability can be gathered in part from Bartle v.
Home Owners Co-operative, Incorporated.6 There defendant was a co-
operative corporation organized for the purpose of providing low cost
housing for veterans. Its wholly owned subsidiary, Westerlea, was orga-
nized to undertake construction and operated so that it would make no
profit to insure a savings to the veterans. Westerlea failed, and by ex-
tension agreement, the creditors continued operation until it became
bankrupt several years later. The trustee in bankruptcy was denied re-
covery to the extent of the creditors' claims from the parent corporation
because all of the creditors knew of the real purpose of the corporation.
As the dissenting judge points out, the parent's shareholders became
the beneficiaries of the subsidiary's insolvency, but the majority held
that such a purpose was within the limits of public policy. What is to
be noted is that there was a subsisting practice reasonably known to all
creditors of the subsidiary of removing all gain and obviously some
assets.
Subsisting management or mismanagement practices are probably
a limitation on relief for the subsequent conduct of a shareholder or
affiliate because they give plaintiffs reasonable notice of the risks they
incur when extending credit to a particular corporation. The "lease-
hold" cases, where deliberate default would appear to be condoned by
the courts, illustrate that a shareholder or affiliate will not incur lia-
bility when the plaintiff knew that the corporation was utilized solely
as a shield against liability.77 The pattern of conduct supporting lia-
bility where there is no antecedent misrepresentation thus seems to be
defendant's stripping the corporation of assets or otherwise impairing
the plaintiff's security when such conduct by the defendant is not a
subsisting practice, or when the circumstances surrounding the making
of the contract do not give the plaintiff notice of the likelihood of such
conduct. In neither class of cases are the reasonable expectations of
the shareholder or affiliate defeated.
It is difficult to describe the nature of the legal wrong that supports
relief against a shareholder or affiliate when the wrong occurs subse-
quent to the credit transaction. Antecedent wrongs are analogous to the
75 Accord, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
76 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955).
77 Wagner v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 237 App. Div. 175, 261 N.Y.S. 136, aff'd, 261
N.Y. 699, 185 N.E. 799 (1932); North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N.E.2d 391,
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1936). Accord, Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 262
N.W. 371 (1935). Cf. Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1927).
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tort of deceit, but this analogy does not fit conduct which involves no
misrepresentation of present fact and which occurs after credit is ex-
tended. The wrong is more like a breach of warranty that the corpora-
tion will be managed in a manner conducive to the preservation of
adequate capital security for the obligation. Nevertheless, the relatively
few cases concerning this kind of wrong appear to shift all or none of
the loss to the defendant without differentiating between the loss that
may be due to the breach of such a warranty and the loss that would
be due to business risks assumed by the plaintiff. This remedial incon-
sistency might be explained by arguing that the defendant should have
the burden of proving the business loss in mitigation, but would usually
be unable to sustain the burden. The warranty analogy is further beset,
however, with a statute of frauds problem since it was the corporation
which made the agreement with the plaintiff. A third analogy is also
possible. Creditors' remedies are generally directed against officers and
directors who control the activity of the corporation. Perhaps the best
explanation of creditor recovery in these occasional cases is a special
creditors' remedy arising when the shareholder or affiliate, by causing
the corporation to deal with the plaintiff, has established a duty to con-
duct itself in a manner consistent with the preservation of such capital
as would reasonably be expected under the circumstances of the credit
relationship. It is liable to the plaintiff for the breach of this duty
because of its effective control and lack of notice that its control would
be used to impair the corporate wealth relied upon as security for the
debt. Whatever the nature of the wrong in these cases, a creditor's
recovery may be predicted when defendant's conduct is inconsistent
with plaintiff's reasonable understanding and expectation of the de-
fendant's control and effective management of the corporation at the
initiation of the consenual credit relationship.
In a third class of cases the reason for shareholder or affiliate lia-
bility cannot be described as a fraud or wrong in the common law sense,
but is better described as a supervening illegality which taints a prior,
lawful contractual relationship and makes the continuation of the terms
of the prior relationship wrongful as to the plaintiff. In May Depart-
ment Stores Company v. Union Electric Light & Power Company,"
defendant power company acquired control of a subsidiary power com-
pany which supplied electric power to plaintiff under contract. Utility
rate legislation limited the rates that defendant could lawfully charge,
but did not disturb the lawfulness of the subsidiary's prior contract.
Under defendant's control, the subsidiary was relieved of all of its
former customers except plaintiff, and its power distribution system
78 341 Mo. 288, 107 S.W.2d 41 (1937).
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integrated with defendant's. On plaintiff's suit to recover the differ-
ence between the contract rates paid and the lower, permissible tariff
rates, defendant was held liable on the ground that the statutory
scheme made the rates charged unlawful. The court was satisfied that
defendant had used its control to wrongfully achieve by the subsidiary
device what it could not do directly.
It is doubtful whether cases like May involve disregarding the
corporate entity. The subsidiary in May was not in default nor affected
by the statute, thus was not obligated to the plaintiff. An acceptable
analysis might be that the defendant was liable for violating the statute
protecting electric power consumers independent of its relation to the
subsidiary, just as it might be subject to injunction for statutory viola-
tions.7 9 Thus in the consensual relationship situation, subsequent il-
legality may warrant a remedy against a shareholder or affiliate, even
in the absence of an obligation on the part of the corporate contractor.80
In the absence of a fraud or wrong, or illegality in one of the fore-
going classes, relief against a shareholder or affiliate has been uni-
formly denied in the contract cases."-
Inadequate capitalization is frequently discussed and often treated
as supporting shareholder or affiliate liability.82 There is sound au-
thority that, absent a legal fraud or wrong, inadequate capitalization
is not itself a basis for relief in the contract cases. 5 Unless there is a
misrepresentation, the consensual creditor with notice that he is dealing
with a corporation should be taken to have assumed the risk of the
79 Cf. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Corp., 127 F. 247 (E.D. Wis.
1905) ; cases cited note 19 supra.
80 Cf. Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 623 (NJ). Ohio
1928).
81 New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668 (6th Cir. 1918); Richmond & I.
Const. Co. v. Richmond, N. I. & B.R.R., 68 F. 105 (6th Cir. 1895) ; Carlesmo v. Schwebel,
87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948); Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d
259 (1937) ; Finley v. Union Joint Stock Land Bank, 281 Mich. 214, 274 N.W. 768 (1937) ;
Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 262 N.W. 371 (1935); Bartle v. Home Owners
Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955); Lowendahl v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936);
Wagner v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 237 App. Div. 175, 261 N.Y.S. 136, aff'd, 261 N.Y.
699, 185 N.E. 799 (1932); North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N.E.2d 391, cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1936); Ohio Edison Co. v. Warner Coal Co., 79 Ohio App. 437, 72
N.E.2d 207 (1946). See Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d
265 (2d Cir. 1929).
82 See, e.g., Automotriz del Golfe de California SA. de C. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792,
306 P.2d 1 (1957).
83 Carlesmo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948); Bartle v. Home




insolvency of his debtor. It is difficult to perceive a reason why he
should not be permitted to do so, and when he has had an opportunity
to investigate the financial reputation of his debtor, it is difficult to
maintain that he has not assumed the risk. Arguably the small creditor
trusting the corporation's credit on an impression of wealth is in a
different position since his account would not ordinarily warrant the
expense of investigation. He would therefore act reasonably in reliance
on an appearance of wealth, but authority is lacking and unlikely to
develop on this point because such small claims do not produce litiga-
tion. When the shareholder or affiliate causes the corporation to deal
with the small creditor, it should be guilty of an implied misrepresenta-
tion of worth according to business usage, and liable then on the model
of a deceit action for the bad account.
Tort cases present an entirely different problem with respect to
adequacy of capitalization since tort plaintiffs are rarely consensual
creditors and cannot be taken to have assumed the risk of insolvency.
Sound public policy might require a certain capitalization before recog-
nition of limitations on liability when the public is exposed to the risks
of harm by defendant shareholder's or affiliate's business.84 Cases not
involving consensual creditors are therefore frequently inapposite to
contract claims problems.
Inadequate capitalization doctrines also present thorny problems
of measurement. What is inadequate for the purpose of economic deci-
sions like entry into business, the extension of credit, or for taxation85
need not be and probably is not the same as that for the purpose of
holding a shareholder or affiliate. There is a danger that hindsight
might be used in the determination. Furthermore, such a doctrine of
wrong nullifies the benefits of the corporate form of business organiza-
tion which is designed to encourage risk capital. Should a creditor be
willing to take the risk of insolvency of his debtor corporation, the law
would not, in the absence of another legal wrong, imply any sort of
equitable guarantee of objective adequacy of capital which would tend
to discourage entrepreneurial capital.
Since the contract claims against shareholders and affiliates usually
arise on the insolvency of the obligor corporation, and since inadequate
capitalization in the economic sense is not infrequently a cause of corpo-
rate insolvency, it is not surprising that it is present in many of the
contract cases. But like the other factors embraced by the instru-
84 See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); cf. Ross v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 106 N.J.L. 536, 148 A. 741, aff'g 7 N.J. Misc. 469, 146 A. 37 (1930).
85 See Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.) cert denied,
352 U.S. 1031 (1956) (thin incorporation: debt treated as equity for income tax purposes).
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mentality rule, it is more or less present in all cases against shareholders
or affiliates, and its effect immeasurable. 8 Its logical difficulties and
adverse policy implications should recommend its relegation to the role
of supporting inferences of legal fraud or wrong which, like the instru-
mentality rule, may be its real utility. 7
There remains a question whether the fraud or wrong of the de-
fendant shareholder or affiliate is a sufficient basis for relief without
showing that the defendant disregarded the corporate obligor's separate
existence, principally by failure to observe corporate formalities. The
only common element of denounced dominance that can be found in
the cases granting relief is the control relationship."' Other factors re-
cur but seem, as does inadequate capitalization, to be more sympto-
matic of wrong than wrong. It might be anticipated that a shareholder
intending to defraud creditors or finding an opportunity to do so would
tend to avoid the time and expense of formality, although a clever
wrongdoer might appreciate the favorable evidentiary inferences of
strict observation. Just such a question was presented to the United
States Supreme Court, and the answer is perplexing.
In United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company,"9
the United States sued to enjoin violation of federal law prohibiting
railroads from transporting articles of their own manufacture to dis-
courage rate favors. Defendant railroad was in violation for transport-
ing products of United States Steel, its parent corporation, if the parent-
subsidiary relation did not preclude application. The court9 ° held that
the mere power of control did not warrant disregarding the corporate
individuality for the purposes of the statute. Subsequently, United
States v. South Buffalo Railroad Company91 came up on substantially
the same question, the holding company controlling both the producer
and the railroad having "ostentatiously" observed the railroad's corpo-
rate formalities on the Elgin model. Pointing to reliance on Elgin, the
court declined to hold there was a violation, observing that they might
not approve the scheme if writing on a new slate.2
While the Elgin and South Buffalo cases are distinguishable from
contract cases on the ground that they are statutory interpretations,
and while their authority is somewhat dulled by the doubts of the
86 Compare cases cited notes 2, 7 and 10 supra, with cases cited notes 9 and 24 supra.
87 Cf. Carlesmo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948).
88 See cases cited notes 2, 7 and 10 supra.
89 298 U.S. 492 (1935).
90 Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo, JJ., dissented.
91 333 U.S. 771 (1948).
92 Id. Black, Douglas and Murphy, JJ., joined Rutledge, J., in a vigorous dissent.
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Soutk Buffalo majority and the vigor of the dissents, they remain a
potential trap for the unwary. No contract precedent has been found
denying relief when the formalities are observed but a legal fraud or
wrong is shown. Since the factor of control seems to be the only common
condition to relief, it might in itself be sufficient when there is a wrong. 3
C. The Injury, Injustice, or Inequity to Plaintiff
The third condition to relief against a shareholder or affiliate is
said to be a showing that there will be an injury, or unjust or inequitable
result, if plaintiff is not afforded a remedy in disregard of the corporate
entity. 4 As discussed above, this third element of liability is occasion-
ally included within the second, the fraud or wrong of the defendant. 5
Separate conceptualization perhaps facilitates understanding and re-
flects the equitable nature and origin of relief against a shareholder or
affiliate for a corporate obligation, but it does not seem to produce a
different outcome."
The foregoing classification of defendant's legal fraud or wrong
presumed injury. However, some cases are better understood when the
injury is observed as a separate requirement. For example, in the cases
involving "leasehold" corporations, where relief against the shareholder
or affiliate clearly causing the corporation to default is denied in the
absence of a misrepresentation, it may be easier to explain the rather
harsh result by classifying the injury as a separate element.9 7 Thus it
may be said that disregarding the corporate entity is an extraordinary
device not warranted when the plaintiff knew of the instrumentality
relation between his lessee and the defendant, and he is not legally
injured when the defendant chooses to avail himself of what is in effect
an option to default. When a deliberate default manipulated by the
defendant is said to constitute no wrong under the two element analysis,
it fails to account for plaintiff's notice of such possibility and his as-
sumption of the risk of such default.
There is also an unresolved question of whether the solvency of
the corporation precludes recovery from a shareholder or affiliate be-
cause the plaintiff has an adequate remedy against the corporate obligor.
It does not appear that this issue is ever litigated, possibly due to the
insolvency or near insolvency of the obligor corporation in nearly every
case where a remedy is sought against a shareholder or affiliate on a
93 Cf. cases cited notes 2 and 7 supra.
94 Powell ch. IV.
95 Id. § 14.
96 See note 56 supra.
97 See cases cited note 65 supra.
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contract claim."' It would seem that plaintiffs do not hazard a corpo-
rate entity action if there is any other remedy open to them.
III. ALTERNATE THEoRIms
In addition to disregarding the corporate entity, several other
theories of action are frequently advocated in creditor suits against
shareholders or affiliates. These theories are often confused with the
problem of disregarding the corporate entity, but they differ greatly
by imposing liability on the defendant as a principal rather than in its
capacity as a shareholder or affiliate which is not a principal.
A. Agency
Agency is frequently referred to in cases involving claims against
shareholders or affiliates, but usually in a non-technical sense as a syn-
onym for terms such as "adjunct" or "instrumentality". 99 Occasionally
however, an attempt to introduce technical agency rules into the prob-
lem of disregarding the corporate entity is made with the result that
agency and improper control relationships are confused.
If it can be shown that the consensus necessary for an express or
implied in fact agency relationship was present and that the corporation
was legally the agent of its shareholder or parent, or affiliate, then
there is no utility in disregarding the corporate entity because the
shareholder or parent, or affiliate is liable at the plaintiff's election as
a principal independent of any fraud or wrongful conduct, and inde-
pendent of disclosure or nondisclosure of the agency relationship."'
There is no legal objection to a technical agency relationship between
a corporation and a shareholder or affiliate since both are legal entities
free to contract, but it might be anticipated that such relationships
would be rare because the very reason for incorporation is usually the
avoidance or limitation of liability as a principal.
It cannot be maintained that stock ownership or control creates a
technical agency relationship between the owner, as principal, and the
corporate entity, as agent, since statutory or common law immunity
embodied in the limited liability principle refutes agency despite the
resemblance. 10 1 To attempt to analyse the contract cases in terms of
an agency relationship implied in law, which is to say that none is re-
quired upon a proper showing of wrong, would do no more than restate
98 See Powell § 17.
99 New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668 (6th Cir. 1918) (third Carpenter
case). See Powell § 21.
100 Cf. Luckenback S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
254 U.S. 644 (1920). See generally Powell § 22.
101 Powell § 23.
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the present rules while perverting the principles of agency which impose
liability on a principal without fraud or wrong."°2 More objectionable
is analysis in terms of agency relationships implied in fact which re-
quires attributing an agency relation to permissible control functions.
Such an approach is inconsistent with the protection supposedly af-
forded by incorporation. 10 3
Technical agency rules are simply not applicable when it is sought
to disregard the corporate entity for the purpose of a contract claim
against a shareholder or affiliate. Where the term "agency" is not used
by claimants and courts in its non-technical sense, it appears that the
claimant was in doubt of his ability to establish a technical agency
relationship and had brought suit on both agency and wrongful control
grounds, often getting relief without any distinction between logically
inconsistent grounds being made.'04
B. Identity and Enterprise Entity
The theory of identity'0 5 and the theory of enterprise entity'016 are
not identical, but they have the same effect when applied to the contract
cases. Both result in the conceptualization of the obligor corporation
and the shareholder or affiliate as one for the purpose of affording a
remedy against the shareholder or affiliate.
All would concede that at some point a corporation must cease to
exist under the state statutory scheme. Its formal corporate structure
may be so deteriorated that it is absurd to maintain that there is yet a
corporation. Clearly, when this point is reached the shareholder is not
doing business as a corporation, but as an individual, and there is little
resistance to his individual liability. 7 When the deterioration is less
unequivocal there may still be such an interrelation of affairs that the
conclusion is irresistible that there is a "oneness" in what are not
clearly separate entities, and courts may treat the enterprise as indivi-
dual for the purpose of imposing liability without emphasizing the fraud
or wrong necessary to relief against a shareholder.' 8
Whatever its worth in cases not involving limited liability,10 9 the
102 See authorities cited note 99 supra.
103 Powell § 22. See New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668 (6th Cir. 1918).
104 See Luckenback S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920);
Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 673, 105 P.2d 649 (1940).
105 See Powell § 24.
106 See Latty 213-19.
107 See Automotriz del Golfo de California SA. de C. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792,
306 P.2d 1 (1957) ; Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957).
Cf. Codomo v. Emmanuel, 91 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1956).
108 See cases cited note 107 supra.
109 See, e.g., U.S. Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U.S. 106 (1923); United States v.
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concept of identity has doubtful validity in the contract cases where
incorporation for the very purpose of distinctiveness as an obligor is
permissible." Where the obligor corporation is clearly in existence, and
limited liability is a permissible objective, there seems to be little utility
in finding an identity of interest, which, without a showing of legal
fraud or wrong, is not a proper basis for relief."'
It has been suggested that the entire economic unit of which the
corporate units are parts be considered the entity liable to creditors of
the corporate units.1 2 While this theory of enterprise entity no doubt
has great merit as a basis for economic decisions like extending credit
to a parent corporation or a holding company, or entering upon a new
business venture, or for the governmental decisions involved in the
regulation of business or taxation," 3 it is inherently antithetical to the
principle of limited liability and the policy behind it which permits an
allocation of risks by separate incorporation of subsidiaries." 4 It is
further to be noted that economists themselves do not agree on what
constitutes a single business entity, and there is a problem of whether
an entity is the same for all purposes." 5 At least in the contract cases,
the theory of enterprise entity seems to have limited justification al-
though the economic realities of intercorporate relationships need not
and are not ignored by the courts."6
If the creditor cannot show that the shareholder or affiliate is a
principal to the credit transaction, he cannot recover on agency, iden-
tity, or enterprise entity theories. He must then rely on the theory of
disregarding the corporate entity and prove its three elements-the in-
strumentality, the wrong, and the injury. The deficiencies of the first
element, the instrumentality rule, have been discussed, and it is sug-
Walter, 263 U.S. 15 (1923). Of these two cases Mr. Justice Holmes reportedly said:
"Twice lately I have had to guard against the corporate fiction becoming a non-conductor
in the wrong place." Wormser, "Disregarding of the Corporate Fiction-When and Why,"
23 Colum. L. Rev. 702 (1923).
11o Cf. Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832
(1955).
II" See cases cited notes 9 and 24 supra. See generally Fletcher §§ 41-48; Powel §
12. But see Luckenback S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir.) (semble),
cert. denied, 254 U.S. 644 (1920) (alternate grounds of agency and identity).
112 Latty 213-19.
113 Accord, National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
14 See Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832
(1955) ; North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N.E.2d 391, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655
(1936); Ohio Edison Co. v. Warner Coal Co., 79 Ohio App. 437, 72 N.E.2d 207 (1946).
115 Latty 213-19.
116 May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 288, 107
S.W.2d 41 (1937) (supervening illegality affects lawful contract utility rate charged by
subsidiary). See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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gested that the rule should be rejected and replaced by a requirement
of showing a control relationship between the defendant and the corpo-
ration. This showing should support an inference that such control en-
abled defendant to use the corporation to effect the legal fraud or
wrong that caused plaintiff's injury.
IV. THE INSTRUMENTALITY RULE SHOULD BE REJECTED IN
CONTRACT CASES
The vice of the instrumentality rule is that it is not well related to
the results in contract cases. Dominance by the defendant of the affairs
of the obligor corporation appears to be present in all of the cases
where a creditor seeks to avoid corporate limitations of liability.117
Defendant's intermeddling and disregard of corporate formalities such
as directors meetings and separate record keeping are frequently shown,
but it is difficult to see how these matters could harm the creditor."8
The economic benefit defendant derived or intended to derive from
the corporation is described in the opinions in cases where relief is
granted, but it clearly exists in cases where relief is denied.1 9 While
there may be a correlation between these factors and relief, it is cer-
tainly indirect and seems to be unduly amplified by the emphasis in
court opinions.
While the origins of the rule may be traced to dicta, 20 there are
perhaps two reasons for its apparent currency. First, creditors will
conform their suits to precedent and may be expected to marshal evi-
dence of defendant's dominance, intermeddling, and benefit when they
feel there is basis for a claim against a shareholder or affiliate. Such
evidence will not be ignored by courts bound by precedent, and per-
haps not greatly concerned with this complex doctrine which is infre-
quently invoked, but will be seized upon or explained away by opinion.
Second, there is frequently a direct relation between these factors and
the legal fraud or wrong of the defendant. Their presence often sup-
ports the inference of wrongful conduct by showing the balance of a
scheme to defraud the creditor.' 2 '
To state the rule as a condition to relief, however, produces false
issues. It is nonsense to argue that defendant's dominance, intermed-
dling, and contemplated benefit in its relation to the corporation are
wrong. They are neither lawful nor wrongful for the purpose of relief
117 See cases cited notes 2, 7, 9, 10 and 24 supra.
118 See cases cited note 34 supra.
119 E.g., Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832
(1955).
120 See note 19 supra.
121 See cases cited note 34 supra.
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against a shareholder or affiliate; what is a basis for relief is the fraudu-
lent or deceitful conduct of the defendant. If the defendant has used
the device of incorporation to deceive and defraud the plaintiff, its
separate legal personality will afford him no protection. 122 In the con-
tract cases, the typical defendant has a right to rely on the limited
liability principle and shift some of the risk of the enterprise to credi-
tors.'23 Unless he has somehow misled a creditor or acted subsequent
to the creditor's trust in a manner inconsistent with the creditor's rea-
sonable understanding and expectation, he should not incur liability
and he does not in the cases.'2 4 The control factor is apparently the
only one under the rule necessary to relief, probably because control is
the only nexus with the corporation which will support the inference
that defendant caused plaintiff's loss.' 25 Control itself is not logically
indispensible but is perhaps dictated by the economic realities of most
cases. An affiliated corporation, however, which does not control but
is controlled may be held responsible. 2 Since the other factors under
the rule are not necessary, the validity of the rule is doubtful.
The effect of the instrumentality rule is to confuse lawful business
organization with schemes to defraud creditors by obscuring the dis-
tinction between defendant's conduct toward the obligor corporation
and defendant's conduct toward the plaintiff. Under the rule, factors
coming from and supporting an inference of fraudulent or wrongful
conduct have been given the gloss of fraudulent or wrongful conduct
themselves. Epithet is used to distinguish those present when liability
is to be imposed on a shareholder or affiliate. Thus it cannot be deter-
mined that the defendant has used the corporation as a mere instru-
mentality, adjunct, or alter ego until it has been concluded that de-
fendant is liable for the corporate obligation. Even though there may
be a relation between the factors recited under the instrumentality
rule and defendant's legal fraud or wrong, the utility of the rule is
severely limited when it does not serve to enable prediction of liability.
V. A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
A. The Purpose for Disregarding the Corporate Entity in Each Case
The purpose for which it is sought to obtain relief in disregard of
an asserted corporate entity barrier should limit and control the relevant
factors in defendant's relationships with the corporation and the plain-
122 Compare cases cited note 81 supra with cases cited note 34 supra.
123 See cases cited note 81 supra.
124 See cases cited note 81 supra.
125 Powell § 6(a).
126 See authorities cited note 38 supra.
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tiff.12 7 The reasons for disregarding the corporate entity to provide a
remedy for a personal injury for plaintiff are different than the reasons
for granting a contract claimant relief against a shareholder or affili-
ate.12 Still different reasons prevail in cases where the questions are
the violation of a statute, 29 the application of internal revenue laws,130
or the law of fiduciary obligations. 3' In such cases the limited liability
principle is not in issue.
In the contract cases the principle of limited liability is directly
challenged. Incorporation for the very purpose of limiting liability is
permissible,'132 and the contract claimant is not given a remedy against
a shareholder or affiliate in the absence of a misrepresentation, fraudu-
lent management, or illegality of a kind inconsistent with his reason-
able knowledge and expectation at the time he trusted the credit of
the corporation. 33 An attempt to reconcile the contract cases with
cases not involving consensual credit transactions by comparison of
the defendant's conduct toward the corporation is fruitless: there is no
more than a sometimes similarity.
34
B. The Reason for Liability: Legal Fraud or Wrong
in Contract Cases
Emphasis should be placed on the particular kinds of legal fraud or
wrong that support liability of a shareholder or affiliate for corporate
contractual obligations. The courts invariably require a showing of
defendant's fraud or wrong as a condition to a remedy in disregard of
an apparent entity barrier,'135 but particularity as to the conduct of the
defendant which distinguishes cases in which relief is granted from
those in which it is withheld is not demanded. The result is that conduct
127 May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 288, 107
S.W.2d 41 (1937).
128 Compare Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.RJD. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), with Shafford v.
Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Corp., 142 F. 247
(ED. Wis. 1905).
130 See, e.g., Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945).
131 See, e.g., Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N.Y.S. 883
(Sup. Ct. 1927).
132 Accord, cases cited note 24 supra.
133 See cases cited note 81 supra.
134 In North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N.E.2d 391, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655
(1936), the majority relied on contract cases to hold a parent corporation not liable for
default on a lease by its subsidiary leasehold corporation while the dissent cited principally
noncontract cases.
135 See authorities cited note 53 supra.
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producing liability is obscurely reported and difficult to detect in many
opinions where a shareholder or affiliate is held liable. 36
Perhaps the failure to clearly state the grounds for granting or
denying recovery is due to the emphasis given the instrumentality rule,
or perhaps it stems from the difficulty in articulating reasons for a
judicial feeling that the corporate entity has been interposed as a shield
against liability in the wrong place. 13 7 Whatever the reason, distinct
classes of defendant's fraud or wrong can be found in the contract
cases granting relief, and the presence of one of these particular wrongs
is directly related to a remedy against a shareholder or affiliate.
The kinds of fraud or wrong which support relief in contract cases
are misrepresentations before plaintiff became a creditor,'3 8 defendant's
conduct inconsistent with plaintiff's reasonable expectation as a creditor
subsequent to the establishment of the credit relationship,' 39 and super-
vening illegality which is not properly defendant's wrong, but a deter-
mination of public policy which limits defendant's conduct and benefits
a class including plaintiff.140 The kinds of misrepresentation support-
ing relief are those inconsistent with plaintiff's reasonable understanding
that he was trusting only the credit of a corporation. The shareholder
or affiliate will be liable for corporate obligations when it suppresses
the fact of incorporation,' 4' when it leads the creditor to believe that it
guarantees the corporate obligation,'42 or when it creates a false ap-
pearance which causes a reasonable creditor to misapprehend the worth
of the corporate obligor. 14 3
Inadequate capitalization has been treated as a basis for the li-
ability of a shareholder or affiliate,'144 but its effect in the contract cases
is doubtful. While the failure to provide an adequate capital fund from
which injured members of the public may obtain redress may be wrong-
136 E.g., cases cited note 34 supra.
137 See note 109 supra.
138 See, e.g., Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942).
139 See, e.g., Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.
Ark. 1951).
140 See May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 288, 107
S.W.2d 41 (1937).
141 See Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957). It is
apparent that the duty to disclose is controlled by the creditor's reasonable understanding
that he is dealing with a corporation when his contact is with the individual shareholder
defendant. Where the fact of incorporation is obvious, the point is not raised.
142 See Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942).
143 See Portsmouth Cotton Oil Refining Corp. v. Fourth Natl Bank, 280 F. 879
(M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 284 F. 718 (5th Cir. 1922).
144 See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (SD.N.Y. 1962).
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ful when a corporate enterprise creates a substantial public hazard,'45
there is no sound reason for limiting the allocation of risk between a
consensual creditor and a shareholder or affiliate which openly limits
its liability by incorporation. Although inadequate capitalization is fre-
quently discussed in the contract cases, it has been distinguished from
the kinds of fraud or wrong which support relief. 4 It should not be
treated as a factor directly supporting relief against a shareholder or
affiliate, or even indirectly supporting relief if the plaintiff under-
stood that he was dealing with a corporation nominally or inadequately
capitalized.
Irrespective of the adequacy of capitalization and defendant's
dominance, intermeddling, or benefit, the principle of limited liability
has been given effect in contract cases when plaintiff's reasonable under-
standing of the allocation of risk has not been increased by defendant's
antecedent or subsequent conduct.147 The one exception is where an
external factor, for example legislation, changes the quality of defend-
ant's conduct which was lawful under the contract to wrongful under
the law. Emphasis on the particular legal fraud or wrong of the de-
fendant is necessary to understand the process of disregarding the
corporate entity for contract claims.
C. The Effect of Disregarding the Corporate Entity
on the Principle of Limited Liability
Relief against a shareholder or affiliate for a corporate obligation
should never be considered independent of its effect on the limited
liability principle. It is clear that the limitation of liability is a permis-
sible reason for incorporation,'4" and the shareholder or affiliate ex-
pectation that it will not be individually liable for the corporation's
obligations is not lightly dismissed by the courts however inarticulately
stated the policy supporting limited liability may be.149
In cases not involving consensual creditor's claims, where the
limited liability principle is not directly challenged, courts have more
readily ignored the separate existence of a corporate entity because the
corporate entity barrier has frequently been asserted for impermissible
145 Id.
146 Carlesmo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948). Accord, Hanson
v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259 (1937).
147 See cases cited note 81 supra.
148 E.g., Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832
(1955).
149 See Bartle v. Home Owners Co-operative, Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832
(1955).
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purposes.5 0 In the contract cases, however, limited liability will usually
be sustained and the corporate entity will not be disregarded in the
absence of a showing that the shareholder or affiliate has engaged in
conduct that is legally fraudulent or wrongful because it is inconsistent
with the consensual limitation of liability.'5 '
VI. CONCLUSION
A contract claimant seeking to hold a shareholder or parent corpo-
ration, or an affiliated corporation, for an obligation of the corporation
is faced with the principle of limited liability which is a permissible
objective of incorporation. Courts will not lightly disregard the separate
corporate existence of the obligor, but when the defendant has sup-
pressed the fact of incorporation, when it has implied a guarantee of
the obligation, when it has misled the plaintiff by creating an appear-
ance of wealth which was reasonably relied upon, when it has man-
aged the corporation in a manner inconsistent with the plaintiff's rea-
sonable expectation, or when supervening illegality has made the
defendant's management of the corporation wrongful as to plaintiff,
the distinct corporate personality of the obligor has not been accepted
as a defense.
Emphasis on the so-called instrumentality rule tends to confuse
the relevant factors supporting relief in disregard of an apparent cor-
porate entity barrier. The defendant's dominance, intermeddling, and
benefit in its relationship to the corporation are discussed at length in
court opinions, but these factors do not serve to distinguish cases where
relief is granted from those in which it is withheld. Such factors may,
however, have some evidentiary value in supporting inferences of de-
fendant's legal fraud or wrong. Inadequate capitalization is frequently
treated as a factor supporting relief, but its effect is doubtful in the con-
tract cases where no public policy limits the allocation of risks in con-
sensual credit transactions. If an agency relationship exists between the
defendant and the corporation, relief need not depend on the extra-
ordinary device of disregarding the corporate entity. If the consensus
necessary to recover on ordinary agency principles can be found, the
defendant is liable as a principal irrespective of fraud or wrong. If
the defendant shareholder or affiliate is not a principal, the agency
model serves only to confuse. Theories of identity and enterprise may
have merit in taxation or business regulation, but they are poor bases
for shareholder or affiliate liability because they are antithetical to the
150 See cases cited note 2 supra.
151 See cases cited note 81 supra.
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limited liability principle which is of paramount importance in the
contract cases.
The contract claim presents a unique question of the limitation of
liability. Tort claims, arising from non-consensual transactions, present
different questions due to public policy limitations on the allocation of
risks between enterprise and the public. In other kinds of cases, taxa-
tion and statutory interpretation, for example, the questions involved
do not touch limited liability. The purpose for which the corporate
entity is to be disregarded should limit and control the relevant factors
supporting the remedy. In the contract cases the limited liability prin-
ciple precludes recovery from a shareholder or parent corporation, or
an affiliated corporation, in the absence of a showing that the defend-
ant's conduct was inconsistent with plaintiff's reasonable understanding
that he could look only to the corporation to satisfy his claim.
David C. Cummins
